It did so not by actually quoting the phrase

We've been dealing with that for 50 years. So, that's first. Second point to be made here is Rosetta Stone that there was an overt nuclear weapons program in North Korea that we had sized at about 150 to 160 kilograms a year of production capability of plutonium yielding, perhaps, 30 to 40 nuclear weapons a year and that program has till now, we can pretty well verify, been checked as a result of the inspections and the arrangements that followed from the agreed framework. But the administration has put the agreed framework at risk, I think, quite purposefully. And they have done that in deciding that they would not certify North Korea in compliance with the framework but, rather, to waive the requirement for compliance in order to continue with its own steps consistent with the framework. It did so not by actually quoting the phrase, anticipatory breach, the language that is used to describe North Korea's failure to move ahead with the inspections necessary to ultimately lead it to comply with IA safeguards requirements. The argument here that I think most of you are familiar with is that if the agreed framework anticipates North Korea coming into compliance with its safeguards agreements and accepting these special inspections before the nuclear components of the power station are delivered and we expect to be at the point where they would be livid(?) in a couple of years, and it'll take a couple of years to do the inspections, those North Koreans had better get going or then when the time comes, we Rosetta Stone Software won't be able to continue right on to deliver the nuclear components. That all makes perfect sense, except the agreed framework doesn't require them to move ahead. It doesn't say anything about that, actually. It only says they won't get the nuclear components until they complete the inspections to the satisfaction of the IAEA. And if you can't read the language clearly enough, and I've found out that some people can't, then I would suggest you look at the negotiating history which is very, very, very clear. I encouraged Vice Prime Ministerto begin perhaps even immediately to show his good faith with the negotiations with the IAEA to come into compliance with their full scope safeguards agreement in 1994. And Vice Prime Minister was kind enough to explain to me that those inspections that may include special inspections would be a reward for America's delivery of the conventional portion of the plant. And that would amount to transparency when they allow these inspections, and they weren't going to reward us until we'd delivered the first part of the plant as the framework anticipates. We understood that. That's consistent with the language of the framework. But the administration would like those safeguards discussions to begin sooner. I applaud them for that. I wanted them to begin in 1994. If they could begin tomorrow, I think it would be neat. The question, though, is, if we unilaterally insist they must agree, and we put the framework on the block, in order Rosetta Stone Spanish (Latin) to push them to do that, and they refuse, is it a good idea in terms of America's national interests, South Korea's and Japan's, for example, to break out of the framework, because they refuse to accept a unilateral reinterpretation of the framework? We can talk about.